References — Session 8
- Tramèr, F., Zhang, F., Juels, A., Reiter, M. K., & Ristenpart, T. (2016). Stealing machine learning models via prediction APIs. Proceedings of USENIX Security '16, 601–618. https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity16/technical-sessions/presentation/tramer
- Shows that an inference API leaks information about the model and its training data, so "we only call an API" is not a privacy boundary. Model-extraction cost for large media models and the effectiveness of provider-side rate limits are still open. No essential figure.
- Shokri, R., Stronati, M., Song, C., & Shmatikov, V. (2017). Membership inference attacks against machine learning models. 2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), 3–18. https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2017.41
- A concrete test of whether a model memorised a sensitive item — the risk the governance discussion is about. Membership privacy for fine-tuned media models and diffusion models is still poorly understood. No essential figure; draw a data-flow diagram instead.
- Al-Rubaie, M., & Chang, J. M. (2019). Privacy-preserving machine learning: Threats and solutions. IEEE Security & Privacy, 17(2), 49–58. https://doi.org/10.1109/MSEC.2018.2888775
- A readable map of threats and defences that lets students place a managed service in the landscape. Practical privacy for media pipelines — faces, voices and location metadata — is under-served by generic ML privacy work. The threat/solution matrix can be rebuilt as a table.
Teaching note. Narrate Tramèr et al. (2016) for 5–8 minutes, assign the abstract of Shokri et al. (2017) as reading, and close by restating the open problem as the weekly question. Figures are third-party; redraw by default.